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Teaching Legal Reasoning in Law School:
The University of Richmond Experience
By PETER NASH SWISHER*
INTRODUCTION
The concept of legal reasoning is* often discussed in law school but seldom ex-
plained. From the first day of class, for examiile, the typical law student is taught
that s/he must now "think like a lawyer" and must carefully analyze "the law"
through the medium of legal reasoning as applied to a multitude of judicial
casebooks, legislative codes and legal briefs.
However, the actual teaching of a skills technique approach to legal reasoning
- as a process as well as a principle - has seldom been clearly articulated in many
law schools today. This unfortunate situation has resulted from at least two inter-
related causes:
(1) Many legal scholars are still at odds as to what, exactly, constitutes "legal
reasoning"' and
(2) Due to these philosophical problems inherent in the concept of "legal reason-
ing," it is a subject that allegedly "can't be taught," and must be learned by ex-
perience.2
Admittedly, pure logic may play a limited role in many judicial decisions and
the most persuasive attorney or judge may not always be the most logical arguer. An
activist judge, for example, may want a penniless widow to prevail in a contested life
insurance action and then he may subsequently develop the reasoning behind this
decision. But he must nevertheless present his supporting reasons.
So assuming arguendo that logic is not always the primary basis for a legal deci-
sion, logic nevertheless often serves as its justification:
... a skilled lawyer may be able to persuade a judge that a claim which he
himself does not regard as a good one is justified in law; a judge may give a
decision in favour of a pursuer with a pretty face or a given class
background, really because he likes the face or class (yet more insidiously,
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Richmond School of Law, Richmond, Virigina. This
article is based on a paper presented to the AALS Legal Writing, Reasoning and Research Section in San
Antonio, Texas, January 5, 1981.
I See e.g. TWINING AND MIERS, HOW TO Do THINGS WITH RULES 140 (1976). ("Very general ques-
tions of the kind 'what is the role of logic in legal reasoning?' are ambiguous and misleadingly simple.")
See also A.G. Guest's Logic in the Law in OxFoRD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE (1961) which is criticized by
Robert Summers in Logic in the Law, 72 MIND 254-8 (1963) which, in turn, is likewise criticized by Phillip
Mullock in The "Logic" of Legal Reasoning, 75 MIND 128-130 (1966). And see the criticism of Gottlieb's
LOGIC OF CHOICE (1968) by Neil MacCormick in LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL THEORY 34 (1978). ("I
find the whole argument from p. 66 to p. 77 entirely opague.")
I See e.g. 0. W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881). ("The life of law has not been logic, it
has been experience.") But see Twining and Miers, supra note 1, at 141. (". .. even a cursory reading of
Holmes reveals that he was concerned to show that logic is only one of a number of factors in 'determin-
ing the rules by which men should be governed."')
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because of an unconscious prejudice in favor of the face or class), but osten-
sibly because the reasons for his decision are such and such ... (and here
follows a carefully articulated and ostensibly flawless chain of [logical] legal
reasons for his decision).
[So] insincerity is even more revealing than sincerity. Why is it that a
lawyer who wants to win a case in order to be sure of his fee, rather than
because he really believes in it, does not say so? Why does a judge not make
his reason explicit by granting Mrs. McTavish her divorce just because she
has a ravishingly pert retrousse nose? Because such are not accepted as good
logical reasons for sustaining claims or granting divorces... Hence... the
process which is worth studying is the process of argumentation as a process
of justification.3
Any study of legal reasoning is therefore an attempt to explain the logical criteria as
to what constitutes a good or bad, acceptable or unacceptable, legal argument.
4
With the understanding that reasonable scholars and critics may differ, it is
nevertheless this article's contention that law schools today must still strive to teach
the basic logical principles-and process-of legal reasoning. By analogy, a swim-
mer must learn at least a few basic strokes in order to survive in his new environ-
ment. The same is true with law students and legal reasoning. An elementary foun-
dation in legal reasoning skills, limited though it may be, is still better than nothing
at all-especially when the latter alternative offers only confusion and
misunderstanding.
The purpose of this article is to discuss one such approach in teaching the prin-
ciples and process of legal reasoning to first year students at the University of Rich-
mond Law School. Although the author realizes that this is only one of many ap-
proaches to the subject in question, it is hoped that some of the fundamental
assumptions within this discussion may serve as a catalyst for teaching legal reason-
ing techniques in other schools as well.
I. LEGAL REASONING: THE PRINCIPLES
The philosophical context of logic as the "dictate of reason" is as old as the
writings of Plato and Aristotle and has exercised a profound influence upon the
development of Western legal thought, where it has been stated and restated many
times. The primacy of "pure reason" has not gone unchallenged, however, and the
philosopher David Hume, for one, has argued that there are limits to reason in prac-
tical experience.'
Basically, Hume's argument, reduced to its essentials, is that our faculty for
reasoning can operate only upon given premises and assuming certain premises, we
can then by reason reach certain conclusions which follow from these premises. In-
deed, reason can guide us in seeking to verify or falsify certain premises concerning
matters of fact generally.6
I N. MACCORMICK, LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL THEORY 14-15 (1978).
Id. at 12-13.
See, supra note 2.
See HUME, ENQUIRY CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS (many editions) Appendix I and A
TREATISE OF HuMAN NAruRE Books I and II. See also N. MacCormick, supra note 3, at 1-4.
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The correctness of a deductive syllogism stripped of any empirical component,
can be easily established:
All Xs are Y.
This thing is an X.
Therefore, this thing is a Y.
This syllogism is logically correct but factually uninformative. The empirical con-
tent, or what Hume would call "what reason operates upon," is therefore critical to
logicial reasoning in advancing our knowledge of matters of fact generally. Take,
for example, the following syllogism with a major premise, a minor premise and a
conclusion:
Major Premise: Whosoever, while married, shall go through another
marriage ceremony recognized by law, shall be guilty of
bigamy.
Minor Premise: Allen, while married, went through another marriage
ceremony recognized by law.
Conclusion: Allen is guilty of bigamy.
(Expressed in this way, the major premise and the conclusion are normative; and the
minor premise is a proposition of fact.)
This method of deductive legal reasoning can also be expanded to include other
premises as well. For example:
Premise 1: Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being with
malice aforethought.
Premise 2: Joseph shot and killed Henry.
Premise 3: Joseph had no lawful justification or excuse to kill
Henry.
Premise 4: Henry is a human being.
Premise 5: Joseph killed Henry with malice aforethought.
Conclusion: Therefore Joseph is guilty of murder.
Legal reasoning is therefore a process of inference- the process of passing from
certain premises which are assumed to be true, to other premises distinct from the
first but deemed to follow from them, to reach a logical conclusion.,
This type of legal reasoning is known as deductive reasoning. In deductive legal
reasoning, the conclusion must follow from the premises as a matter of logical
necessity; if one accepts the premises, then one must also accept the conclusion,
since it is logically compelling or conclusive. Reasoning is conclusive where the con-
clusion follows from the premises; it is inconclusive where the premises support, but
do not compel, the conclusion. 8
Inductive reasoning, on the other hand, is inconclusive reasoning, because it en-
compasses all kind of reasoning where the premises may support, but do not com-
pel, the conclusion. 9 For example:
Premise 1: In case A, elements X, Y and Z were present and plain-
tiff won.
T. GREENWOOD, THE DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY 264-5 (1942).
TWINING AND MIERS, supra note 1, at 139-40.
Id. at 143-4.
Vol. 74
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Premise 2: In case B, elements X, Y and Z were present and plain-
tiff won.
Premise 3: In case C, elements X, Y and Z were present and plain-
tiff won.
Conclusion: In all cases where elements X, Y and Z are present,
plaintiff should win.
In the above example, if elements X, Y and Z were provable elements of
negligence-such as breach of duty, causation, and damages-then the conclusion
would be supportable. If elements X, Y and Z were a bailiff, a judge and the flag,
then this inductive conclusion would not be supportable. Clearly, deductive logic,
being conclusive, is much more desirable for purposes of legal reasoning than induc-
tive logic although both approaches have been used in various legal problems.10
Although deductive reasoning is superior to inductive reasoning in terms of its
conclusiveness, its forcefulness depends on the truth of its premises. For example:
All contracts are legally binding.
Jake contracted with a prostitute.
Therefore, Jake's contract is legally binding.
This deductive syllogism is logically correct but its conclusion, though necessarily
true if the premises are true, has no force since the major premise is false.
Likewise, the truth of the observations which form the premises of an inductive
argument is equally important to the forcefulness of its conclusion. Thus, an impor-
tant step in legal reasoning is to test these premises arguing by analogy or arguing by
distinguishing, since "the finding of similarity or difference is the key step in the
legal process.""I What is argument by analogy?
An analogy is simply a comparison, and an argument from analogy is an
argument from comparison. An argument from analogy begins with a com-
parison between two things, X and Y. It then proceeds to argue that these
two things are alike in certain respects, A, B and C, and concludes that
therefore they are also alike in another respect, D, in which they have not
[previously] been observed to resemble one another ... It will be apparent
at once that an argument from analogy is never conclusive.' 2
Arguing by analogy has also been described this way:
The basic pattern of legal reasoning is reasoning by example. It is reasoning
from case to case. It is a three-step process described by the doctrine of
precedent in which a proposition [premise] descriptive of the first case is
made into a rule of law and then applied to a next similar situation. The
steps are these: similarity is seen between cases; next the rule of law inherent
in the first case is announced; then the rule is made applicable to the second
case. 13
Arguing by distinguishing, on the other hand, is demonstrating the
11 See e.g., N. MACCORMICK, supra note 2, chapters II and III where the author argues that in
order to fully justify legal arguments and conclusions, deductive legal reasoning must be applied. Id. at
52.
E. LEVI, AN INTRODUCrION TO LEGAL REASONING 2(1949).J2 . HOsPERS, AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS 476 (1970).
23 E. LEVI, supra note 11, at 1-2.
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dissimilarities in judicial cases and other premises. It is the antithesis of arguing by
analogy.
Arguing by analogy and arguing by distinguishing are thus two important
elements in testing the premises and conclusions of deductive and inductive legal
reasoning, since the facts and law of legal precedent are seldom identical to any
subsequent legal issues. 14
II. LEGAL REASONING: THE PROCESS
The process of teaching legal reasoning at the University of Richmond Law
School begins in the first year Legal Research and Writing Course."
Prior to preliminary lecture-discussions on legal reasoning, including com-
parisons of deductive and inductive logic,' 6 each student is provided with an in-
troductory outline of general principles, as well as a glossary of basic terminology
related to legal reasoning. 7 Examples of deductive and inductive legal reasoning are
then discussed and analyzed in class.' 8
" "... [There are few areas of the law in black and white. The grays are dominant and among
them the shades are innumerable." Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, at 545 (1948).
"s This two-credit hour course in the fall term begins with an Introduction to Legal Reasoning,
followed by a "Closed Memorandum" legal reasoning and writing problem, then a number of weeks with
legal research exercises in the law library and culminating in a final "Open Memorandum" problem
which utilizes the combined skills of legal reasoning, writing and research. The second semester Legal
Research and Writing course is a one-credit hour Moot Court program requiring the writing and oral
argumentation of an appellate brief.
" See supra notes 2-11 and related discussion.
17 The following glossary was used in the fall term Legal Research and Writing course.
Legal reasoning may be defined as the analysis and synthesis of factual information and legal precedent
[the premises] through the medium of legal argument, to reach a logical conclusion.
Before this process can be discussed, the following definitions must be understood:
1) Law - certain rules of human conduct and behavior with sanctions or
penalties for noncompliance
2) Facts - occurrences or events; things done
3) Issue - a matter that is in dispute between two or more parties; a point of
debate or controversy
4) Precedent - something that serves as an example or rule to authorize a subsequent
act of the same or analogous kind; a rule established by long practice
5) Legal Precedent - precedent created by constitutions, legislative statutes, judicial cases,
administrative regulations and executive orders that establish the basic
laws of a particular society
6) Premise - a proposition inferred as a basis of argument
7) False Premise - a proposition that appears to be true but on closer analysis is found
not to be true.
8) Inference - the act of passing from one premise considered to be true, to another
whose truth is believed to follow from the former premise
9) Argument - the process of testing premises, applying them to a specific problem
and drawing conclusions
10) Arguing by Analogy - testing the inference that if two or more things agree in some respects,
they may also agree in other respects; similarity between things that
are otherwise unlike; argument that different things are governed by
the same general principle
11) Arguing by Distinguishing - pointing out an essential difference; argument that authority cited as
applicable to a particular problem is really inapplicable
Vol. 74
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Once the students have become familiar with the "premise-to-conclusion" con-
cept of legal reasoning, 19 a new mnemonic is introduced as a mental aid to the legal
reasoning process - IRAC. 20 The IRAC mnemonic is a familiar concept in many
law schools and basically follows a deductive form of legal reasoning.2'
An excellent medium for teaching this IRAC legal reasoning process at the
University of Richmond Law School has been through Lon Fuller's The Case of the
Speluncean Explorers.22 The Case of the Speluncean Explorers is set in the mythical
Commonwealth of Newgarth in the year 4300. During the previous year, five
Speluncean explorers were trapped in a limestone cave that was sealed off by a land-
slide. Faced with the possibility of starvation in the cave, they killed and ate one of
their own number, Roger Whetmore. The four survivors were ultimately convicted
of murder and the case is now on appeal to the Supreme Court of Newgarth.23
12) Public Policy Argument - argument that certain action should be taken for the public good
13) Analysis - a breakdown of the component parts of something in order to
discover its important inner relationships; a reduction to simpler parts
or divisions
14) Synthesis - a combination of various elements, often diverse, to form a coherent
whole; an inference in which the conclusion follows from the premises
15) Conclusion - the necessary consequence of two or more premises; a reasoned judg-
ment; an end of the reasoning process
16) Reasoning - the power of comprehending, inferring or thinking in an orderly,
logical way
" See supra notes 6-7 and related discussion. (Describing the "general-to-specific" deductive ap-
proach as an "inverted pyramid" is also helpful.)
" See supra notes 4-8 and related discussion.
20 In the fall term Legal Research and Writing course, the IRAC mnemonic was described this way:
An excellent mental mnemonic to help remember the most important elements of this legal reason-
ing process is IRAC - which may be used in analyzing and writing case briefs, legal memoranda,
appellate briefs, opinion letters and law school essay examinations:
I = Issue Presented
R = Rule of Law
A = Argument
1. Discussion (application and testing of the law and facts)
2. Defenses (if any)
C = Conclusion
There is often more than one major Issue in a given legal problem. A careful analysis of the problem will
separate the major issues from tangential minor issues.
The Rule of Law is the applicable legal precedent which is the authority for the legal argument.
The Argument is the analysis of the important legal and factual relationships within the problem
and whether or not they are analogous to or distinguishable from established legal precedent. Are
there any applicable defenses in this particular situation?
The Conclusion is the final synthesis of the Argument: the actor is guilty or not guilty; liable or not
liable; under the applicable Rule of law, for the reasons stated in the Argument.
21 The IRAC mnemonic has been used in numerous law schools, the C.L.E.O. Program and
various bar review courses. It is a deductive legal reasoning approach with the Issue Presented and Rule
of Law constituting the major premises; the Argument being the application and testing of minor
premises and the resulting Conclusion.
2 62 HARv. L. 11Ev. 616 (1949). This article is also published in booklet format and may be ordered
directly from the Harvard Law Review Association to comply with current copyright requirements.
23 Id. at 619. The facts of this case are unusual, to say the least and there is also additional legal
precedent to whet the students' appetite. See e.g., Regina v. Dudley, 14 Q.B.D. 273, 15 Cox C.C. 624
(1884) (a seventeen year-old cabin boy killed and eaten in a lifeboat) and U.S. v. Holmes,.26 F. Cases 360
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The legal reasoning IRAC mnemonic for the Speluncean Explorers case was
presented in the following manner, with the following student assignment:
Using the IRAC legal reasoning mnemonic, analyze and brief the ap-
plicable arguments in The Case of the Speluncean Explorers:
I = Issue: Are the Speluncean explorers guilty of murder in the killing of
Roger Whetmore?
R = Rule of Law: "Whoever shall willfully take the life of another shall be
punished by death" Newgarth Consolidated Statutes Annotated
(New Series) § 12-A (4275)
A = Argument:
1. Discussion (application and testing of the law and facts)
2. Defenses (if any)
C = Conclusion: Guilty(?)
[Be prepared to discuss in class the respective arguments of Chief Justice
Trupenny, Justice Foster, Justice Tatting, Justice Keen and Justice Handy.]
Applied in a classroom setting, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers has been
quite effective in teaching the various techniques of legal reasoning: it demonstrates
numerous' premises (and false premises) that must be thoroughly analyzed by the
students; it discusses the "law of nature"2' as opposed to "civil law;" 21 it presents
numerous examples of arguments by analogy26 and arguments by distinguishing; 2 it
states the elements of murder 2 and possible defenses to murder;2 9 it identifies judges
who are philosophically "activist" 3" and those who are "strict constructionists;', it
speaks to the interrelationship of the judicial, 32 legislative33 and executive 34 branches
of government and it concludes with the surprising fact (to many'first-year law
students) that "reasonable judges may differ" in reaching conflicting logical conclu-
sions through deductive and inductive legal reasoning.
In short, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers is an excellent medium to in-
troduce first-year law students to the process of legal reasoning through a "premise-
to-conclusion" approach, as well as through an IRAC legal reasoning approach.
The final step in the student's introduction to legal reasoning skills at the
University of Richmond Law School is the preliminary analysis of a fact situation
and related legal precedent in preparation for the writing of a law office memoran-
(1842) (bosun's mate killed and eaten in a lifeboat). The only case in America of murder and cannibalism
seems to be a Colorado case in the late 1800's where a prospector named Alfred Packer, while stranded in
a winter blizzard, killed and ate his partner. Legend has it that the trial court judge, in sentencing Packer
to be hanged, was heard to remark: "Damn your hide, Alf Packer-there were only three registered
Democrats in this whole county, and you just ate one of them."'
24 62 HARV. L. Rav. 620-3 (1949).
23 Id. at 626-67.
26 Id. at 623-5, 629.
27 Id. at 628-9, 631-6.
"1 Id. at 619, 632-3.
29 Id. at 624-6, 641-4.
10 Id. at 620-6.
31 Id. at 631-7.
32 Id. at 625-6, 633-4.
"1 Id. at 633-5.
"4 Id. at 619-20, 642-3.
Vol. 74
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dum. (This is called a "closed memorandum" assignment, since it requires no legal
research.)
In the fall term of 1980, the students were given a fact situation and five
analogous judicial opinions dealing with a hypothetical personal injury case involv-
ing Adam Caine, a high school student in St. Louis, Missouri, who was kicked in the
head and seriously injured during a soccer game."
The major issues were identified in class using an IRAC legal reasoning ap-
proach 6 and since the case was one of first impression in Missouri,3 7 strong
arguments by analogy and arguments by distinguishing had to be made in support of
the plaintiff. The students were further instructed to test the premises of any possi-
ble defenses to this action.3 8
The legal reasoning process involving this particular problem thus allowed the
students to review and combine the philosophical principles of legal reasoning with
the IRAC mnemonic technique in order to analyze the applicable facts and law in
preparation for the eventual synthesis of this legal reasoning process in the form of a
law office memorandum.
CONCLUSION
A basic introduction to legal reasoning can-and should-be taught in law
schools, both as a philosophical principle and as a skills technique process. Various
11 The applicable cases were Moore v. Jones, 120 Ga. App. 521, 171 S.E.2d 390 (1969), Gaspard v.
Grain Dealers Mutual Ins. Co., 131 So. 2d 831 (La. App. 1961), Nabozny v. Barnhill, 31 Ill. App. 3d 212,
334 N.E.2d 258 (1975), Niemczy v. Burleson, 538 S.W.2d 737 (Mo. App. 1976) and Hackbart v. Cincin-
nati Bengals, Inc., 601 F.2d 516 (10th Cir. 1979). Alternate problems have included a slip-and-fall case in
a supermarket, a disputed contract action and a possible felony murder case.
"6 The IRAC legal reasoning mnemonic for this case was presented as follows [bracketed issues are
added]:
CAINE V. BOWEN
(a personal injury case)
Issue #1: [Assault and Battery]
Rule of Law:
Argument: 1. Discussion of law and facts
2. Defenses, if any
Conclusion:
Issue #2: [Reckless Misconduct]
Rule of Law:
Argument: 1. Discussion of law and facts
2. Defenses, if any
Conclusion:
Issue #3: [Ordinary Negligence]
Rule of Law:
Argument: 1. Discussion of law and facts
2. Defenses, if any
Conclusion:
" See e.g. Note, Tort Liability for Players in Contact Sports, 45 U.M.K.C. L. REv. 119, at 128
(1976). ("No Missouri case has imposed tort liability on a participant in a contact sport. But neither has
any Missouri case barred imposition of such liability.")
11 Possible defenses in this particular problem included consent, assumption of risk and con-
tributory negligence.
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examples of deductive and inductive legal reasoning can be easily demonstrated, in
conjunction with other related principles, *within a sound legal reasoning
framework.
The process of teaching legal reasoning through a skills technique method can
then be demonstrated through an initial "premise-to-conclusion" aproach and may
later be integrated into an IRAC approach, which serves as a useful mnemonic to aid
in the overall legal reasoning process.
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